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Abstract. This article presents a critique of recent arguments opposing ratification by the United States 
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
 
Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., former deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear forces and arms control 
policy and former acting assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, has written an 
article opposing ratification by the United States (US) of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that 
was recently published in The New Republic. This article is both highly representative of arguments 
opposing CTBT ratification and illustrative of the weaknesses of such arguments. 
 
Gaffney correctly argues that it is impossible to verify a ban on all nuclear testing. Yet this is the case for 
any treaty for any topic for any set of political entities throughout history. Does Gaffney mean to 
discount any treaty per se as inevitably unhelpful to a political entity's security interests? If so, 
diplomatic history is replete with examples of treaties as success, failures, or even as bearing no 
significant effect. CTBT ratification may be contrary to US security interests, but not based on this 
argument. 
 
Gaffney correctly argues that there may well be countries folded into any multilateral monitoring and 
response regime that will increase impediments to an actual finding of noncompliance with a ratified 
CTBT or other weapons treaty--regardless of the quality and quantity of technical data yielded by the 
CTBT's worldwide seismic monitoring system and of that data's interpretation. These impediments could 
include the stymieing of on-site inspections that would be authorized by United Nations Security Council 
members according to the CTBT. Yet all multilateral treaties have, do, and probably will reflect different 
degrees of support, different interpretations, and different behavioral triggers among the various 
ratifiers. This is merely another version of the above argument discounting the past, present, or future 
value of all treaties--and deserves the same response. 
 
Gaffney argues that "[E]ven if the CTBT were fully verifiable, it would be irrelevant to the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons (p. 18)." This is because one can develop and acquire nuclear weapons without the 
need for nuclear explosive testing--instead through covert and clandestine acquisition programs 
including outright theft. Gaffney is right about the alternative route for weapons acquisition. However, 
his logical jump to CTBT irrelevance for weapons proliferation is, well, illogical. CTBT supporters do not 
claim that the ratified treaty would prevent covert and clandestine acquisition including theft, only that 
it would significantly decrease the probability of proliferation through nuclear explosive testing. Here, 
Gaffney is attacking a claim that is not made by CTBT supporters about the CTBT in the attempt to attack 
the CTBT and its supporters. 
 
Gaffney maintains that the safety and reliability of a political entity's nuclear weapons--both germane to 
these weapons' role as a deterrent--cannot be maintained without nuclear explosive testing. In fact, he 
states that it will be "impossible to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent over time (p. 18)" without such 
testing. Yet all approaches to assessing safety and reliability--viz., nuclear explosive testing, non-nuclear 
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explosive testing, and computer simulations--have their own strengths and weaknesses some of which 
are not yet well understood by physicists. Foregoing nuclear explosive testing will equate to foregoing 
some of its strengths and weaknesses. Some of the same strengths and weaknesses are shared by other 
approaches. Others are not. There is no 100% accurate route to safety and reliability even with all 
known approaches including nuclear explosive testing. Whether foregoing nuclear explosive testing's 
strengths overrides the advantages of foregoing its weaknesses is--at present standards of knowledge--a 
metaphysical Issue as much as physical one. By setting the safety and reliability bar at 100% accuracy, 
Gaffney is ensuring that the CTBT does not measure up. What he does not say is that there is nothing 
that measures up--including that which he bemoans losing. (This is the case both for newer weapons as 
well as older ones that might need to be refurbished.) 
 
Gaffney argues that the older nuclear weapons are, the more refurbishment of such weapons becomes 
necessary, the more nuclear explosive testing becomes vital, and the more problematic computer 
simulation becomes in the quest for safety and reliability. This argument is but a repeat of his argument 
made in the previous paragraph to which is added the many difficulties of refurbishment--e.g., 
dismantled production lines, the challenge of replicating designs, technologically obsolete components, 
federal safety and health guidelines prohibiting some original components, adequate time, and 
sufficient funds. His previous argument has been critiqued in the previous paragraph, while the 
additional refurbishment difficulties would still be difficulties even without the constraints on nuclear 
explosive testing. (Interestingly, Gaffney adds that there are newer, smaller, lighter, cheaper, and more 
reliable materials and equipment that are available for refurbishment. Sure, this presents a possible 
problem of replicating less advanced materials and equipment and of the possibility of untoward effects 
on safety and reliability. He does not consider that more advanced materials and equipment also 
represents the possibility of greater safety and reliability.) 
 
Gaffney argues that most of the original experts who designed and tested nuclear weapons have left the 
"industrial and laboratory complex, taking with them irreplaceable corporate memory (p. 18)." His 
conclusion from this correct premise is that (without nuclear explosive testing) the US "will be able 
neither to modernize its nuclear arsenal to meet future deterrent requirements nor to retain the high 
confidence it requires in the older weapons upon which it would then have to rely for the foreseeable 
future (p. 18)." Yet President Clinton's terms of CTBT ratification would allow the US to leave the treaty's 
confines if future deterrent requirements dictated such an action. Moreover, Gaffney still does not give 
us any information about why nuclear explosive testing would be required above and beyond other 
approaches to safety and reliability. Lastly, his implied paean to the original experts seems to function as 
a backhanded insult to their contemporary counterparts. It's as if extensive and valuable knowledge has 
died off with its possessors, as opposed to the vast preponderance of such knowledge being stored and 
protected in the teaching "hand-off" from generation to generation, manuals, journals, books, and the 
newer variants of information technology. He also ignores that the more recent generations of experts 
can build on and from the expertise of their antecedents--regardless of radical interpretations of 
philosophers of science and technology who take a hyper-paradigmatic and discontinuous perspective 
on basic and applied knowledge. And Gaffney does not acknowledge that newer knowledge might more 
than compensate for whatever has been lost. 
 
Even if his arguments are correct about the significance of problems in decreasing weapons proliferation 
and maintaining safety and reliability, Gaffney does not consider that these same arguments might work 
to the advantage of CTBT supporters in their quest for a huge goal irrespective of minimizing 
proliferation and maximizing safety and reliability--reinforcing nuclear deterrence. If one is less sure 
about what's out there, how well what's out there works, and how well what one has works, could not 
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one be even less likely to develop, acquire, deploy, and employ nuclear weapons assets? Whether the 
answer is more, less, or it depends on the situation, Gaffney has not significantly treated what is ipso 
facto a psychological question. The same applies to another psychological question--the consequences 
for the political calculations within, between, and among political entities of his arguments and those of 
supporters of the CTBT . (For example, would a CTBT or non-CTBT world be more likely to be not only 
more peaceful, but also more prosperous, healthy, well-educated, and so on?) 
 
Gaffney seems to be the prisoner of a constricting ideology that assumes that a tough-minded approach 
to national security and defense Issues equates to a deontological instead of a consequentialist 
perspective. Tough as in the greater quality and/or quantity of weapons is the Way to security and 
defense righteousness. Tough as in the bottom line effects on security and defense will inevitably follow, 
even if data and events seem to support a contrary position. In other words, the Way cannot be not 
supported--as is the case in psychologically dogmatic belief systems of True Believers. This unsaid 
ideological stance in Gaffney's arguments merits as much if not more analysis than the technical aspects 
of his CTBT opposition. Unfortunately, the same can be said for CTBT supporters. Research on the 
psychological basis, styles, and consequences of ideologies has never been so important. (See Davies, 
M.F. (1998). Dogmatism and belief formation: Output interference in the processing of supporting and 
contradictory cognitions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 456-466; Florian, V., & 
Mikulincer, M. (1998). Terror management in childhood: Does death conceptualization moderate the 
effects of mortality salience on acceptance of similar and different others? Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 24, 1104-1112; Gaffney, F.J., Jr. (October 25, 1999). The flawed test ban treaty. Poor 
pact. The New Republic, pp. 16; 18; Herr, C.F., & Lapidus, L.B. (1998). Nuclear weapons attitudes in 
relation to dogmatism, mental representation of parents, and image of a foreign enemy. Peace and 
Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 4, 59-68; Kane, R. (1998). Dimensions of value and the aims of 
social inquiry. American Behavioral Scientist, 41, 578-597.) 
 
(Note: A more recent article by Richard Perle, a former assistant secretary of defense for international 
security policy, has provided several additional arguments opposing the CTBT that merit analysis. 
 
Perle argues that the CTBT is not only not 100% verifiable, but also not 100% enforceable. However, as 
above, no treaty has ever contained enforcement procedures that cover all situations and are 
guaranteed of being fool-proof and totally effective. Here Perle, like Gaffney, is committed to an 
argument that rule out all treaties irrespective of the successes that many treaties have had throughout 
history. Moreover, even if a treaty is not 100% enforceable, a political entity or entities can effect the 
will and motivation to enforce the treaty outside the treaty if Issues of survival are at stake. There is 
certainly no precedent of international law that a political entity should willingly choose to cease to 
exist--to commit the supreme sacrifice--for the good of a treaty. Then what good is a treaty? A treaty 
can provide an appropriate combination of positive over negative consequences that merits ratification. 
Both Perle and Gaffney choose to not address the parameters of this more sophisticated and complex 
analysis. 
 
Perle maintains that "the argument that [CTBT] ratification would discourage North Korea, Iraq, Iran, 
India and Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons produced laughter in the Senate cloakroom (p. 
A31)." The argument that CTBT may not have a motivational effect on so-called rogue states certainly 
can be well-supported. However, most CTBT supporters do not maintain that ratification will lead to 
such motivational change. Instead, they argue that CTBT will make it ever more difficult to test nuclear 
weapons and/or their components--an argument that neither Gaffney nor Perle directly address. 
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Perle argues that the CTBT is not subject to unilateral amendment or reservation. Thus, he maintains, 
the US and its allies would be locked into whatever deficiencies the CTBT presents with no out. 
However, as with Gaffney's argument about the CTBT preventing the meeting of future deterrent 
requirements addressed above, President Clinton's terms of ratification would allow the US to leave the 
treaty under certain conditions. Treaties also can be renegotiated. That is, there are ways out.) (See 
Perle, R. (October 19, 1999). Neither isolationists nor fools. The New York Times, p. A31.)(Keywords: 
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